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Abstract
The benets of separating drug prescribing and dispensing are still unclear, in
particular when drug consumption is characterized by important spillovers. We inves-
tigate the role of dispensing physicians in the consumption of antibiotics character-
ized by two opposite external e¤ects: infection prevention and control, and bacterial
resistance. We model the interaction between competing physicians (with and with-
out dispensing of drugs) and patients exposed to bacterial infections and show that
spatial e¤ects of consumption may generate ambiguous results. Then, we propose
an empirical exercise which exploits data from small geographic areas in Switzerland
where two regimes - prescribing physicians and dispensing physicians - are possible.
We consider spatial aspects of antibiotic consumption by means of combined spatial
lag and spatial error econometric estimators for panel data (SARAR models). We
nd evidence that dispensing practices increase antibiotic use after controlling for
determinants of demand and access, and spatial e¤ects. Whether dispensing prac-
tices lead to an increase of antibiotic consumption beyond socially optimal levels is
unclear and requires further research.
JEL classication: I11; I18; D12; D21; D43; D81; D82
Keywords: Physician dispensing, Prescribing behaviour, Antibiotic use, Con-
sumption spillovers, Spatial e¤ects.
Institute of Economics (IdEP), University of Lugano; ETH Zurich, Switzerland.
yETH Zurich, Switzerland.
zDepartment of Engineering, University of Bergamo, Italy; Institute of Economics (IdEP), University
of Lugano, Switzerland. Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 058 666 4731; fax: +41 058 666 4733. E-mail
address : giuliano.masiero@usi.ch. Support from the Swiss National Science Foundation is acknowledged.
We are grateful to Karine Moschetti for invaluable collaboration on early stages of this research. We
thank participants to the III Health Econometrics Workshop (Siena, December 2012) and two anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments and precious advice. Any remaining mistakes are ours. We also thank
IMS Health Switzerland for providing data on antibiotic sales.
1 Introduction
Prescribing and dispensing of drugs are one of the main aspects of access to primary health
care. In most developed countries, the main role of family physicians is to prescribe drugs
without direct dispensing. Doctors are not allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients
in several OECD countries such as Italy, Germany and Scandinavian countries. Still,
direct dispensing is possible in some countries such as Switzerland, where physicians can
sell drugs to their patients in most regions (cantons), with some exceptions across the
country.
The reason for separating drug prescribing and dispensing is to optimise drug treat-
ment by avoiding a conict of interest for the prescriber and by ensuring good practice in
dispensing (Trap and Hansen, 2003). Lundin (2000) shows that physicians are exposed
to moral hazard and the amount and type of drugs prescribed depend on who bears
the cost and on the existence of insurance companies that lead physicians to overpre-
scribe. Evidence of moral hazard is reported by Chiappori et al. (1998) and Coulson
et al. (1995), respectively, for the demand for home visits and the demand for prescrip-
tion drugs. Liu et al. (2009) show that prot incentives do a¤ect dispensing physicians,
suggesting that physicians act as imperfect agents. Abood (1989) shows that dispensing
doctors charge higher retail prices, whereas Rischatsch and Trottmann (2009) indicate
that dispensing physicians have a greater probability of prescribing drugs that o¤er high
margin, when compared with non-dispensing physicians. Gilbert (1998) and Morton-
Jones and Pringle (1993) nd that dispensing physicians issue more prescriptions per
patient and have higher prescribing costs than non-dispensing physicians, respectively.
Finally, Trap and Hansen (2002) examine di¤erences in the rationality of the prescrip-
tion in relation to diagnosis and symptoms and nd that dispensing doctors prescribe an
antibiotic 2.5 times more frequently than non-dispensing doctors. The authors conclude
that dispensing practices may lead to increasing health hazards and bacterial resistance.
Nevertheless, the benets of separating drug prescribing and dispensing are still un-
clear. This is because direct dispensing of drugs may increase patient benets when
consumption is characterized by important spillovers, particularly in areas where access
to physician services is relatively poor. The purpose of this article is to investigate the role
of dispensing physicians in the consumption of health care services (antibiotic treatment)
characterized by important consumption externalities. External e¤ects of consumption
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are relevant mainly for anti-infective drugs, and are certainly crucial for antibiotics. An-
tibiotic drugs are generally used to treat respiratory and gastrointestinal infections which
are among the most common infectious diseases acquired in the community. As discussed
by Hess et al. (2002), these infections are characterized by a spreading process across
regions, i.e. the infection initiates in one region and then spreads across other regions (see
Werneck et al. (2002) for an example of the spatial spread of an infection). Consequently,
benets from antibiotic use can extend to other individuals in the community. However,
a second type of externality may arise because of endogenous bacterial resistance. This
reduces antibiotic e¤ectiveness and increases patient costs (Rudholm, 2002), which in
turn enlarges the ine¢ ciency caused by moral hazard.
The e¤ects of consumption externalities are disregarded in all the above studies on the
behaviour of dispensing physicians. Hence, the main novelty of the paper as with respect
to the existing literature is the inclusion of spatial spillovers in the analysis of antibiotic
prescriptions by dispensing physicians. We innovate both from a theoretical and an
empirical perspective. We rst propose a theoretical model to investigate the behaviour
of di¤erent types of general practitioners under imperfect information on the nature
of patient infections, and prevention and bacterial resistance externalities. We show
that antibiotic prescriptions may be higher for dispensing practices, though consumption
spillovers may lead to ambiguous results. Then, we propose an empirical exercise which
exploits data from small geographic areas in Switzerland where two regimes - prescribing
physicians and dispensing physicians - are possible. This provides the ground for a
natural experiment.
We consider spatial aspects of antibiotic consumption by means of combined spatial
lag and spatial error econometric estimators for panel data (SARAR models). Spatial-
econometric estimators in health economics have been recently applied, for instance, by
Lachaud (2007), Moscone et al. (2007), and Moscone and Tosetti (2010a, 2010b). These
studies underline the importance of taking spatial aspects into account when modelling
the utilization of health care services. We are aware of only few empirical studies investi-
gating spillover e¤ects of antibiotic consumption (Filippini et al., 2009a; 2009b; González
Ortiz and Masiero, 2013), though without considering dispensing practices. Our empiri-
cal analysis indicates that dispensing practices induce higher rates of antibiotics use, after
controlling for patient characteristics, epidemiological factors, access to drug treatment,
and consumption spillovers. Still, the welfare implications of this result are puzzling.
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The remaining of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we sketch the
theoretical model and discuss the implications of antibiotic externalities for dispensing
and non dispensing practices. Section 3 empirically investigates the impact of dispensing
practices on antibiotic use and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Antibiotic treatment in general practice: a theoretical
approach
We investigate the market for antibiotic treatment by extending the classical product
di¤erentiation model (Hotelling, 1929) in an innite-period framework where patients
and general practitioners interact under imperfect information on the nature of infections
and antibiotic consumption externalities. Nature assigns a health problem (bacterial or
viral infection), i 2 fb; vg, to each of the 2 individuals uniformly distributed along a
unit line at the beginning of each period. Consumers initially observe a symptom but
cannot infer the type of infection they su¤er from. Each generation of consumers lives
for two periods. Therefore, in each period there is a mass of 2 consumers: a mass y
composed of young consumers and a mass o composed of old consumers. The proportion
of young consumers entering the market and the proportion of old consumers leaving the
market in each period are the same, with y = o = . In the rst period there is only
one generation of consumers, , and all of them are young.
In the market there are 2 general practice rms (GP j, with j 2 [l; r]) of equal size,
located at the two extreme points of the distance. General practitioners can either be
allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients or not. All individuals consult a doctor and
di¤er with respect to their location and the type of infection. Doctors make prescriptions
based on a diagnosis signal. The accuracy of a GPs prescription is related to the level of
diagnostic services provided by the practice (ej), which is not observable to the patient.
Hence, we assume that patients choice of practice is based upon costly distance.
Patients recover naturally from viral infections after a consultation. However, antibi-
otics are necessary to recover from bacterial infections. A second consultation is required
if the patient su¤ers from a bacterial infection and an antibiotic is not initially prescribed.
Consequently, total demand for consultations of GP j by young patients in each period
includes second consultations by patients with a bacterial infection who initially receive
a wrong diagnosis. This is summarized by equation (13) in the Appendix.
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2.1 Prevention and bacterial resistance externalities
At the beginning of each period, nature assigns a health problem to old patients in
the market, like for young patients. However, old patients present a lower probability of
infection because they have been exposed to antibiotics prescribed in the previous period.
As a consequence, they benet from the preventive e¤ect of antibiotic use (see also Ellison
and Hellerstein, 1999) and do not need to consult a doctor in the second period. We
assume that the number of old patients with an infection decreases by a proportion
 2 [0; 1] of the number of young patients (now the old patients) receiving antibiotics in
the previous period (from both practices). Antibiotic prescriptions are derived using the
demand for consultations by young patients in the Appendix. Consider that only half of
the initial number of consultations by young patients from each GP lead eventually to
an antibiotic prescription, and some of the young patients receive antibiotics because of
wrong diagnosis. Eventually, total demand for consultations for GP l in each period t
can be derived by summing up the demand for consultations by young and old patients
(see equation (14) in the Appendix). It is worth pointing out that diagnosis e¤ort by
GP j in period t   1 a¤ects the demand for consultations of both GPs in the following
period because of the preventive e¤ect of antibiotic treatment.
A second external e¤ect need to be considered. The use of antibiotics in period t  1
reduces the e¤ectiveness of antibiotic treatment in the following period because of bacter-
ial resistance. This raises the cost of treatment and the cost for research and development
of new drugs, which represent a negative externality from antibiotic consumption. We
capture this e¤ect by assuming that practices face increasing costs () to cure patients
with resistant bacteria.1
2.2 Market equilibrium: the e¤ects of spillovers and dispensing prac-
tices
General practitioners have an objective function that depends upon the benets and
costs of diagnostic services provided in each period. GPs maximize their discounted ow
of prots non-cooperatively by choosing the level of diagnostic services and taking their
1The parameter  can also be interpreted as the value of providing good care to patients. Indeed,
better diagnostic services in t  1 reduce inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions and, consequently, reduce
future risks for patients.
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competitors strategies as given. E¤ort strategies can change over time.2 Dispensing
physicians di¤er from other practitioners since they get a markup on costs for drugs sold
to the patient. Also, they may incur some costs for keeping drugs on stock. In this sense
they are more similar to a pharmacy than to non-dispensing practices. A shortage of
stock implies risks if patients are unable to receive the required treatment when needed.
On the other hand, large stocks of drugs that have been hoarded increase the risk of
getting closer to the expiry date. Unsold drugs may imply some costs for the practice.
Physiciansobjective and reaction functions and equilibrium conditions are derived in
detail in the Appendix (see equations (15)-(16)).
The equilibrium level of diagnostic services can be summarized by the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 1 A symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in the level of diagnostic ser-
vices is dened by
el = e

r =
 
7
4  1

f + 12  (1  32)z
3
4  (f + z) +
4

, (1)
where  is the marginal prevention e¤ect of antibiotic use, f is doctors consultation fee,
 is the marginal cost of bacterial resistance, z is the price of a dose of antibiotics, 
is the marginal e¢ ciency of diagnostic services,  is doctors initial number of patients,
and  is the marginal cost of diagnostic services.
Equation (1) deserves some comments. Diagnostic services may decrease or increase
with the fee for a consultation (f), depending on the magnitude of the prevention e¤ect
of antibiotic consumption (). Without positive externalities from antibiotic consump-
tion ( = 0), the equilibrium level of diagnostic services decreases with the consultation
fee. This is because a higher fee increases the marginal gains from consultations. Con-
sequently, there are incentives to reduce diagnosis accuracy, which increases the number
of additional consultations. Note also that the negative externality caused by bacterial
2When choosing diagnosis e¤ort rms not only take into account the e¤ects on their current period
prots but also on their demand and costs (bacterial resistance) in the following periods. This dependence
needs to be taken into account when solving the model for the equilibrium levels of diagnostic e¤orts.
Prots in period t depends upon diagnostic services in period t 1 by both GPs. Also, the value function
represented by the ow of all future prots depends on all future levels of diagnosis e¤ort. Consequently,
an equilibrium has to ensure that deviations from current period levels of e¤ort in the future are not
convenient. We require a perfect equilibrium, i.e. each GP selects the diagnosis e¤ort that maximizes its
intertemporal prot given the subsequent strategies of the other GP and itself, whose strategies depend
only on the payo¤-relevant history (Maskin and Tirole, 1988).
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resistance () increases the equilibrium level of diagnostic services. If the cost of treat-
ing patients increases because of resistant bacteria, a higher level of diagnostic services
is required to reduce the number of misdiagnosed viral infection and, consequently, the
amount of antibiotic prescriptions in previous periods. An increase in diagnosis accuracy
lowers the amount of inappropriate prescriptions that contribute to the generation of
resistant bacteria. Positive externalities of antibiotic use that decrease the fraction of
infected patients in period t + 1 have a two-fold e¤ect. First,  decreases the demand
for consultations in period t+ 1. As a consequence, a higher level of diagnostic services
is required to reduce the number of antibiotic prescriptions in period t that generate a
negative e¤ect on doctors revenues in period t+1 (the numerator of equation (1)). But
second, an increase in  also decreases the fraction of misdiagnosed infections in period
t+1, ceteris paribus, which leads to lower prescriptions of antibiotics and reduced gains.
To o¤set this e¤ect, doctors must reduce their level of diagnosis accuracy (the denomi-
nator of equation (1)). Since the marginal impact of  at the numerator of (1) is larger
than the marginal impact at the denominator, the equilibrium level of diagnostic services
increases with prevention externalities, i.e. @e=@ > 0.
Dispensing practices have an e¤ect on the equilibrium level of diagnosis accuracy
through the price of drugs, measured by z. Note, however, that this e¤ect depends on
the magnitude of positive externalities from antibiotic consumption (), and the e¢ ciency
of services provided (). The result is not straightforward. Dispensing practices gener-
ally reduce the equilibrium level of diagnostic services as compared to non-dispensing
practices, provided that  < 2=3. The rationale is that a reduced level of services in-
creases the number of antibiotic prescriptions in period t with relatively low impact on
consultations in period t+1 and, consequently, the gains from antibiotic sales are higher.
This e¤ect is magnied by the reduced incentive to provide accurate diagnosis (at the
denominator of (1)) when there are gains from antibiotic sales. However, the result may
not hold with strong prevention e¤ects ( > 2=3) and low e¢ ciency of diagnostic services
( ! 0). This is because the marginal impact of antibiotic price at the numerator of (1)
becomes positive and prevails over the e¤ect at the denominator.
Using the equilibrium level of diagnostic services dened by (1), we can derive the
amount of antibiotic prescriptions per patient. The total number of antibiotic treatments
in equilibrium in period t is 2DAt = 2
h
Dt   (   DAyt 1 )=2
i
. Substituting for Dt and
DAyt 1 and dividing by the total number of patients (2), we get the per capita antibiotic
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use as
a =

1  
2
e

1  + 
2
e

. (2)
Whether or not dispensing practices lead to higher levels of antibiotic use compared
to non-dispensing practices clearly depends upon the combined e¤ect of nancial incen-
tives from antibiotic sales and externalities from antibiotic consumption. With negligible
prevention e¤ects ( ! 0) antibiotic prescriptions per capita are higher for dispensing
practices as compared to non-dispensing practices.3 Conversely, when prevention e¤ects
are strong (! 1) the result is less straightforward. Note that the rst and the second
terms may move in opposite directions. Consequently, the hypothesis that dispensing
practices increase antibiotic consumption does not follow straightforwardly from our the-
oretical results and will then be empirically investigated in the following section.
3 Dispensing practices: an empirical analysis
3.1 Institutional background
Our theoretical framework suggests that the consumption of antibiotics is inuenced
by factors such as the price of antibiotics and the price of consultations, the incentives
attached to direct dispensing of drugs, and positive and negative externalities of antibiotic
consumption that exhibit a spatial dimension (see equation (2) above). To investigate
further the impact of dispensing practices we propose an empirical approach that exploits
panel data from a country - Switzerland - with variation in the regime of dispensing drugs
across geographic areas.
Switzerland is a federal state made of 26 cantons (states) with remarkable di¤erences
in terms of healthcare organization and policy. Direct dispensing of drugs is not allowed
in some cantons (Geneva, Vaud, Balle ville, Ticino and Aargau). In some areas of
the other cantons direct dispensing is permitted. Generally, the Cantonal authority
allows for direct dispensing to improve access to healthcare services. The decision is
related to the structure of the primary care market in di¤erent geographic areas, which
is relatively stable over time. This decision is not a federal competence and regional
regulators independently decide on the organization of the primary care market. Direct
dispensing of drugs requires parliament approval, that is a national law has to be passed
3Note that the second term between brackets of equation (2) tends to 1, whereas the rst term increases
since @e=@z > 0 when ! 0.
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and is subject to a referendum. Clearly, cultural and historical factors may have played
an important role in the evolution of the dispensing regime across the country.
A detailed fee-for-service system with more than 4600 items is applied for the reim-
bursement of medical services by compulsory private health insurance. A given number
of points is assigned to each type of service according to time, complexity and facilities.
The cantons apply di¤erent values to the basic point, which reects the heterogeneity in
the costs of services across the country.
3.2 Data and spatial overview
We have Swiss quarterly data on antibiotic consumption for the year 2002, disaggregated
by 240 small geographic areas. Generally, a canton is made up of between 10 and 20 small
areas. The population varies between 4; 980 and 125; 275 inhabitants per area. Each
area has at least 4 pharmacies and/or drugstores. Antibiotic consumption is proxied
by antibiotic wholesales to all Swiss pharmacies and drugstores provided by IMS Health
Switzerland.4
Switzerland exhibits relatively low levels of antibiotic consumption compared to neigh-
bouring European countries. The number of dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants
(DID) in 2002 is 32:05 in France, 24:38 in Italy, 13:76 in Germany, 11:75 in Austria, and
only 9:00 in Switzerland (Masiero et al., 2010; Filippini et al., 2006, 2013). Nevertheless,
as shown in Figure 1, the country is characterized by high heterogeneity in consumption
across small areas. Latin regions (French- and italian-speaking regions) in the Western
and Southern part of the country generally exhibit higher levels of antibiotic consump-
tion as compared to German-speaking regions (Central, Northern and Eastern part).
Moreover, regions with high levels of consumption (dark coloured) are often adjacent to
regions with low levels of consumption, which suggests negative spatial correlation from
a visual perspective.
In Figure 2 we illustrate the proportion of dispensing practices in small areas across
the country. This proportion is generally lower in Latin regions than in non-Latin regions.
Nevertheless, the association between antibiotic consumption depicted in Figure 1 and
the presence of dispensing practices does not appear as straightforward as it is probably
expected.
4Detailed data on antibiotic prescriptions and antibiotic use are not available. Consequently, we neglect
the possible mismatch between these gures and assume that patients non-compliance is a negligible
factor.
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3.3 Econometric specication
We adopt a representative consumer approach, namely we specify an econometric model
where the dependent variable is the per capita antibiotic consumption in each geographic
area:
lnDIDjt = 0 + PA lnPAjt + PC lnPCjt + DDISPjt + xxjt + "jt: (3)
DIDjt is the per capita outpatient antibiotic use in the jth market area (j = 1; ::; J)
measured in dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants. Equation (3) includes the price
of a dened daily dose of antibiotics (PAjt), the price of a standard consultation with a
general practitioner (PCjt),5 a vector of our main variables of interest (DISPjt) capturing
di¤erences in practice styles and incentives attached to direct dispensing of drugs, and a
vector of socioeconomic controls (xjt). "jt is the usual error term that will be specied
later. We use a log-log functional form and, therefore, the estimated coe¢ cients can be
interpreted as elasticities.
In order to capture the impact of dispensing practices we use two approaches. In
the rst approach, the vector of dispensing variables is based on two dummy variables:
NODISPjt takes value equal to 1 if there are no dispensing practices in the area, 0
otherwise; DISP50jt takes value equal to 1 if the proportion of dispensing practices in
the area is greater than 50%. The intermediate case where the proportion of dispensing
practices is greater than 0 and lower than 50% represents our benchmark.6 In the second
approach, we use a continuous variable (DISPjt) for the rate of dispensing practices.
Socioeconomic controls include the density of physicians (DPHYjt) and pharmacies
(DPHAjt) in the area, the percentage of population in 5 age ranges (POP1jt POP5jt),
and the incidence of bacterial (campylobacter and salmonella) infections (INFjt), which
is a proxy for the probability of a correct diagnosis in the theoretical model.7 Further-
more, the vector of socioeconomic controls includes the average income in the area (Yjt)
5We use the point value dened by the canton as a proxy for the price of a consultation. Our price is
dened at cantonal level for the year 2001.
6To investigate the robustness of our estimations, we also consider alternative coding choices. A
dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if there are dispensing practices in the area, and 0 otherwise,
is used to overcome possible arbitrariness in setting the threshold to 50%. The results are conrmed.
7Campylobacter and salmonella are the leading causes of gastrointestinal infections. Since data are not
available at local level, we use information at cantonal level. We do not have more precise information,
for instance, on potential need. Diagnosis accuracy improves when the incidence of bacterial infections
is high since the probability to prescribe an antibiotic when it is not needed is lower. We use the average
incidence of bacterial infections calculated over the years 1999-2001.
12
and three dummy variables capturing any borderland e¤ect with neighbouring countries
(DBORjt), whether an area is characterised by Latin (French- and Italian-speaking)
or German culture (DLATjt), and the presence of at least one hospital in the area
(DHOSjt). Summary statistics of variables are provided in Table 1.
Per capita antibiotic consumption in equation (3) mirrows per capita antibiotic con-
sumption dened by equation (2), though it does not derive straighforwardly from the
theoretical model. Some of the covariates can be interpreted as proxies for the parame-
ters of the theoretical model. The dispensing status (DISPjt), for instance, may capture
the presence of a markup on drugs sold by dispensing physicians (z   ). PAjt is a
proxy for the price of antibiotics (z), and PCjt is a proxy for the consultation fee (f).
Consumption spillovers in the theoretical model ( and ) are captured by the spatial
e¤ects of our spatial-econometric specication that will be discussed later in the text.
Variable Description Mean Std dev.
DID Dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants 11.714 13.061
NODISP Whether or not there are no dispensing practices 0.4083 0.0159
in the area
DISP50 Whether or not there is a majority of dispensing 0.2333 0.0137
practices in the area
DISP % of dispensing practices across all practices in the area 0.2187 0.0100
PA Price of a dened daily dose 3.7112 0.3113
PC Price of GP consultations 0.9074 0.0526
Y Income per capita dened in CHF 23465 6849.4
POP1 Proportion of 0-14 in total population 0.1658 0.0243
POP2 Proportion of 15-25 in total population 0.1247 0.0173
POP3 Proportion of 26-59 in total population 0.4956 0.0314
POP4 Proportion of 60-74 in total population 0.1363 0.0213
POP5 Proportion of over 74 in total population 0.0776 0.0190
INF Incidence of common gastrointestinal infections 114.69 22.580
(salmonella and campylobacter) in 100000 inhabitants
DPHY Density of physicians for 100000 inhabitants 565.21 1052.5
DPHA Density of pharmacies for 100000 inhabitants 35.098 39.112
DBOR Whether or not the area borders other countries 0.125 0.0107
DLAT Whether an area has a Latin (French and Italian) 0.4375 0.0160
or a German culture
DHOS Whether or not there is at least one hospital in the area 0.7417 0.0141
Table 1: Variables notation and summary statistics.
A correct econometric approach to the estimation of equation (3) has to deal with
three main issues: the possible endogeneity of price,8 the presence of unobserved het-
8Although both the Wu-Hausman F-test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 2-test do not clearly reject the
null hypothesis of price exogeneity, we deal with this potential endogeneity problem by treating the price
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erogeneity variables, such as infection variables, and the possible spatial correlation of
antibiotic consumption across regions. To address unobserved heterogeneity and spatial
correlation, we follow a two-step approach. We rst estimate classical non-spatial econo-
metric models for panel data. Later, we apply spatial panel data models where the e¤ects
of antibiotic consumption externalities are captured by means of a combined spatial lag
and spatial error econometric approach. Since data at our disposal cover a relatively
short period of time and the estimation of a dynamic model with spatial econometric
methods is not straightforward, our approach focuses on static (spatial-dynamic) models
rather than time-dynamic models.9
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we can specify our model (3) with either
geographic area-specic xed e¤ects (FE) or with geographic area-specic random e¤ects
(RE).10 However, since most of our explanatory variables, including dispensing variables,
do not exhibit within variation, we prefer a RE estimator.11 Indeed, none of the regions
changed the dispensing regime during the period of the analysis. Hence, a FE model is
not suitable. For comparison purposes and to check the robustness of the results, we also
use the between (BE) estimator. In this case, the estimation of model (3) using quarterly
data and cross-sectional data is equivalent. Generally, the results are very similar to those
of the RE model.
As for spatial aspects, we expect that regional antibiotic consumption is a¤ected
by individualsand physiciansattitudes towards antibiotics as well as the presence of
infectious diseases in adjacent regions. Spatial e¤ects can be taken into account by means
of adequate spatial econometrics estimators.12 To incorporate spatial e¤ects we can follow
two approaches: the spatial lag model and the spatial error model or, as proposed by
as an endogenous variable and instrument it with the lagged value of price and the exogenous regressors.
The price of each antibiotic product does not vary across geographic areas in Switzerland. However, the
average price for a daily dose of antibiotics di¤ers because geographic regions vary in the consumption
mix of di¤erent antibiotic categories. Consequently, the price for a daily dose can be endogenous.
9For a time-dynamic approach to antibiotic consumption we refer the reader to a recent paper by
Filippini and Masiero (2012) which uses Italian data.
10For a detailed presentation of econometric methods for panel data see Baltagi (2008) and Greene
(2012).
11We test the hypothesis that the explanatory variables and the individual-specic error terms are
uncorrelated using the Hausman test. The result of the test shows that di¤erences in coe¢ cients between
the RE and the FE models are not systematic, thus implying that the RE model can be preferred.
12For a general introduction to spatial econometrics see Anselin (1988, 2001). For applications of spatial
econometric methods in health economics see, for instance, Moscone and Knapp (2005) and Moscone et
al. (2007). For applications to the economics of antibiotics, see Filippini et al. (2009a, 2009b) and
González Ortiz and Masiero (2013).
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Kapoor et al. (2007), an econometric model that combine these two models. We adopt
the RE spatial error and spatial lag model.13 As suggested by Moscone and Knapp
(2005), the spatial error model is relevant when the distribution of residuals in di¤erent
regions displays spatial correlation. Residual may be spatially correlated if aggregated
shocks hit regional health authorities or there are unobservable risk factors concentrated
across the areas. In our case, this e¤ect may be due, for instance, to an infectious disease
breakdown spreading across the country or unobservable bacterial resistance.
We expect the spatial error coe¢ cient to be positive, because infectious diseases or
unobservable bacterial resistance breakdown in the neighbourhood of area j will deter-
mine an increase of antibiotic consumption in the area. On the other side, we expect
the spatial lag coe¢ cient to be negative because of the presence of spatial spillovers. A
general increase of antibiotic consumption in a neighborhood area decreases the need
to consume antibiotics because the probability of contagion decreases. The spatial lag
coe¢ cient can be interpreted as a proxy for the infection prevention spillover in the the-
oretical model (). This indicates that infection prevention spillovers reduce antibiotic
consumption since doctors have the incentive to make more accurate diagnosis. Fur-
thermore, the spatial error coe¢ cient may represent a proxy for resistance externality in
the theoretical model (). The theoretical model predicts that antibiotic consumption is
higher when bacterial resistance is unknown to the doctor, i.e.  = 0, since the costs of
reduced antibiotic e¤ectiveness are ignored. This would suggest a positive e¤ect of the
(unobservable) spatial error component. Conversely, if the e¤ect of bacterial resistance is
internalized, i.e  > 0, then physicians increase diagnosis accuracy, which in turn reduces
antibiotic consumption. In this case, the e¤ect of bacterial resistance will not be captured
by the (unobservable) spatial error component, but rather by the (deterministic) spatial
lag coe¢ cient.
The econometric specication of the RE model for panel data with J cross-sectional
units observed over T time periods including spatial e¤ects, also referred as SARAR
13 In order to test the presence of spatial autocorrelation we consider several preliminary tests. The
Morans I statistic as described by Kelejian and Prucha (2001) is applied to check for spatial correlation
in the residuals. We also employ the testing procedure described in Baltagi et al. (2007). Both tests
reject the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation in the residuals at 1% signicance level (p-value 0.01).
In order to test for spatial correlation in the dependent variable, we apply the test described in Baltagi
and Long (2008). The test rejects the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation in the dependent variable
at less than 5% signicance level (p-value = 0.018).
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model and proposed by Kapoor et al. (2007), is dened as
DID =   (W 
 IT ) DID +X   + u (4)
u =   (M 
 IT )  u+ " (5)
" = 
 eT +  (6)
where DID is a Jx1 vector of observations on antibiotic consumption per capita; X is
the JxQ matrix of explanatory variables;  is the vector of regression parameters; W
and M are the matrix of spatial weights; u is a vector of spatially lagged residuals;  is
a vector of individual e¤ects and  is a vector of i.i.d. residuals; nally  and  are the
spatial lag and spatial error respectively.
We use identical spatial weight matrices, both for spatial correlation in the dependent
variable and spatial correlation in the residuals, which are dened by a contiguity matrix
with positive entries if two regions are adjacent to each other, and zero otherwise. The
matrix is normalized such that all the rows sum up to one. An illustration of the spatial
weights is given by Figure 3.
Concerning ", following assumptions are made:
" = 
 eT + v (7)
E() = 0 (8)
E(  0) = 2  IJ (9)
E(v) = 0 (10)
E(v  v0) = 2v  IJT (11)
E(v0  (
 eT )) = 0 (12)
where  is a (Jx1) vector of individual (random) e¤ects with zero mean, zero covariance
and variance 2. Further, j and jt are i.i.d. with nite fourth moments. It is assumed
that the matrices IJ   W and IJ   M are invertible (non-singular) and that ,  are
bounded in absolute value.
As expected the Wu-Hausman F-test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of
the spatially lagged dependent variable at less than 0.1% signicance level. To deal
with endogeneity, we also treat the spatially lagged dependent variable as endogenous,
together with price, and instrument it with the spatially lagged exogenous regressors and
lagged price. Note that we can only use three quarters for our estimations since the
lagged price
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is included as an instrument. First-stage regressions on the instruments yield signicant
joint F-tests. Moreover, the p-value of the Sargan-test statistics does not reject the null
hypothesis and concludes that the overidentifying restriction is valid.
For the estimation of the models we follow the approach suggested by Kapoor et
al. (2007), and use a generalized moment estimator. Moreover, since current STATA
commands do not combine the estimation of spatial lag and spatial error models, we
develop additional STATA codes.14
3.4 Estimation results
The results of the estimation of equation (3) using the RE model without spatial error
and spatial lag e¤ects (RE2SLS) are reported in Table 2. Models with spatial e¤ects
(SRE2SLS) are summarized in Table 3. Both tables include the estimation results of two
model specications dened by di¤erent measures of dispensing practices: two dummy
variables (NODISP and DISP50) and a continuous dispensing variable (DISP ).
Generally, the value of the parameters and the number of signicant parameters in
spatial models are relatively close to those reported for the non-spatial models. When
spatial e¤ects are taken into account, the estimated elasticity of income increases. Fur-
ther, in both spatial models the age structure of the population has a lower impact on the
per capita antibiotic sales than in models without spatial e¤ects. The estimated impact
of bacterial infections is positive as expected, but poorly signicant. Finally, the density
of physicians and pharmacies are positively and signicantly associated with local per
capita antibiotic use.
The values of price elasticity of antibiotics obtained in the BE model are close to the
estimates of Baye et al. (1997), who nd negative compensated ( 0:785) and uncom-
pensated ( 0:916) own-price e¤ects for anti-infectives. Ellison et al. (1997) calculate
price elasticities irrespective of drug (cephalosporins) expenditure using US wholesales
data from 1985 to 1991. Their estimates range between  0:38 and  4:34. Our estimated
price elasticities range between 0:14 (not signicant in non-spatial models) to  0:55
(highly signicant in spatial models). The coe¢ cient of price of medical consultations
is not signicant. Although expensive consultations imply higher diagnosis e¤ort, which
may reduce inappropriate prescriptions of antibiotics, this hypothesis is not conrmed
14The main components of these codes are borrowed from Kapoors notes. The do- and ado-les are
available upon request to the authors and may require some preliminary instructions since their format
di¤er from o¢ cial STATA ado-les.
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Random-e¤ects IV regressions
Dispensing dummies Continous dispensing variable
Covariates Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant -2.198744 1.427119 0.123 -3.024184 1.437677 0.035
NODISP -0.0441112 0.0614449 0.473
DISP50 0.2993839 0.0602715 0.000
DISP 0.5856185 0.0938454 0.000
PA 0.1435792 0.7619403 0.851 0.192503 0.817172 0.814
PC 0.2545297 0.4248651 0.549 0.3310219 0.4261601 0.437
Y 0.1341392 0.1086522 0.217 0.1494742 0.1065245 0.161
POP1 0.7770858 0.2902369 0.007 0.707528 0.2854014 0.013
POP2 -0.3992381 0.2628232 0.129 -0.4388904 0.258685 0.090
POP4 -0.0832129 0.2108611 0.693 -0.1966698 0.2121132 0.354
POP5 -0.2448346 0.1039692 0.019 -0.2192098 0.1017727 0.031
INF 0.0146288 0.0420017 0.728 0.0329257 0.0410286 0.422
DPHY 0.1271244 0.0340157 0.000 0.1181553 0.0334417 0.000
DPHA 0.6092891 0.0513577 0.000 0.6456287 0.0515961 0.000
DBOR -0.0001904 0.0583645 0.997 0.0076729 0.0560429 0.891
DLAT -0.0618509 0.0921805 0.502 -0.034946 0.0872025 0.689
DHOSP -0.0006248 0.0560705 0.991 -0.0011009 0.0554195 0.984
dt2 -0.1982564 0.0143699 0.000 -0.1974589 0.015179 0.000
dt3 -0.1824587 0.0149339 0.000 -0.1816195 0.0157927 0.000
 0.25347992 0.24544706
 0.07584716 0.07584716
2 due to i 0.91782296 0.91283258
Number of obs. 720 720
Number of groups 240 240
R2 within 0.6599 0.6545
R2 between 0.7369 0.7497
R2 overall 0.7333 0.7452
Notes: The instruments used in the random-e¤ects IV regressions (RE2SLS) are the lagged variable of
price (PAt 1), Yt, POP1t, POP2t, POP4t, POP5t, INFt, DPHYt, DPHAt, PCt, DBORt, DLATt, DHOSPt,
NODISPt, DISP50t (DISPt in the continous variable regression), dt2, and dt3. First-stage regressions on the
instruments yield signicant joint F-tests.
Table 2: Parameter estimates of random-e¤ects IV regressions (RE2SLS).
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by our results.
The impact of direct dispensing of drugs is of major interest to us. The results re-
ported by spatial models (Table 3) conrm the results of models without spatial e¤ects
(Table 2). These indicate that the proportion of practices without dispensing (NODISP )
has a negative e¤ect on antibiotic sales in both models, although the coe¢ cient is not
signicant. Consequently, we cannot reject the hypothesis that areas without dispens-
ing practices and areas with a relatively small proportion of dispensing practices (below
50%) exhibit similar levels of antibiotic consumption per capita. However, when the
proportion of dispensing practices is relatively high (more than 50%), the e¤ect on an-
tibiotic consumption is positive and signicant. The estimated coe¢ cients suggest that
in market areas where the proportion of dispensing practices is relatively high, antibiotic
consumption is 1:30 to 1:37 times higher than in the other market areas, respectively
for non-spatial and spatial model specications. This e¤ect is conrmed by the results
obtained using a continuous variable representing the share of dispensing practices in
each market area.15 The value of the estimated elasticity varies between 0:58 and 0:68
and is highly signicant. This suggests that a one percent increase in the proportion of
dispensing practices will increase per capita antibiotic consumption by 0:58% to 0:68%.16
Clearly, the association between antibiotic consumption and the dispensing regime could
be due to several reasons. For instance, once the dispensing status has been granted, it is
probably hard to remove the right to dispense, particularly in high revenue drug regions
and because of strong doctorsability to lobby. Also, drug consumption and dispensing
status may both be determined by cultural and historical factors.
The estimates of the spatial error coe¢ cient () and the estimates of the spatial lag
coe¢ cient () are statistically signicant and carry the expected sign.17 The positive spa-
15To check whether there is an interaction between GPs market power and the integration of prescribing
and dispensing, we test interaction terms between the density of physicians and dispensing variables.
These are always insignicant, both in spatial and non-spatial regressions. This is somehow expected
since the density of physicians and dispensing covariates are highly signicant. Most of the variation
is then captured by these variables included separately, and little is left for their interaction. Also, the
interaction between the price of antibiotics or the price of physician consultations with the dispensing
regime does not a¤ect our main results and the coe¢ cient is not signicant.
16We also run separate regressions with the density of the population as an additional regressor. This
allows to better captures the level of urbanization of the areas and, consequently, can be used as a proxy
for travelling distances. The variable is never signicant, nor does it change the results of the other
covariates signicantly. We are then condent that our estimates of the e¤ect of dispensing practices on
antibiotic consumption is quite robust to possible misspecication related to access to medical treatment.
17To investigate the robustness of these results we also estimate spatial lag models and a spatial error
models separately. The estimates conrm the results reported in Table 3.
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tial error coe¢ cient may suggest that unobservable aspects, such as bacterial resistance,
or random shocks, such as a disease outbreak in surrounding areas, will determine an
increase of antibiotic consumption in area i. Other more deterministic spatial spillovers
are captured by the negative spatial lag coe¢ cient. In this case an increase in the con-
sumption of antibiotics in neighborhood areas decreases antibiotic consumption in area
i. This may indicate that the probability of contagions decreases due to the preventive
e¤ect of antibiotic consumption, or that physicians are aware of the adverse e¤ects of
endogenous bacterial resistance and internalize this information in their prescribing de-
cisions. Overall, these results conrm the relevance of spatial econometric models in the
analysis of antibiotic consumption and the e¤ect of dispensing practices.
4 Conclusions
Prescribing and dispensing of drugs are important aspects of access to primary health
care. In most developed countries, these aspects are kept separate and doctors are
not allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients. The separation of prescribing and
dispensing has proved to be e¤ective in reducing drug expenditure, for instance in Taiwan
(Chou et al., 2003). However, this separation may be costly in terms of limited access
to drug treatment and low levels of infection prevention. In Switzerland, physicians are
allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients in most cantons, with some exceptions
across the country.
In this paper, we rst extended the classical spatial model to investigate the impact
of dispensing practices on the consumption of antibiotics under positive (infection pre-
vention) and negative (bacterial resistance) consumption externalities. We showed that
the interaction between consumption externalities and incentives to dispensing practices
may reduce diagnosis accuracy and, consequently, increase the likelihood of antibiotic pre-
scriptions. The rationale behind a higher consumption of antibiotics under a dispensing
regime may be that dispensing practices are more exposed to moral hazard. Neverthe-
less, this e¤ect may be mitigated by the positive externality of infection prevention and
control.
We then examined the e¤ects of dispensing practices empirically using data on an-
tibiotic consumption in small geographic areas from a country (Switzerland) with two
regimes for general practitioners - with and without direct dispensing of drugs. The ap-
proach relies on spatial-econometric estimators for panel data, which take spatial aspects
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Spatial random-e¤ects IV regressions
Dispensing dummies Continous dispensing variable
Covariates Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant -0.5600248 0.7059426 0.428 -0.931256 0.6927078 0.179
NODISP 0.0075422 0.0545024 0.890
DISP50 0.3738889 0.0632064 0.000
DISP 0.6853876 0.0992924 0.000
PA -0.5476143 0.3067118 0.074 -0.4935378 0.3062494 0.107
PC 0.0614923 0.4785733 0.898 0.1189752 0.4670196 0.799
Y 0.2506859 0.1172455 0.033 0.2670415 0.1139665 0.019
POP1 0.4642093 0.267977 0.083 0.4615374 0.2614212 0.077
POP2 -0.349267 0.2318164 0.132 -0.4088315 0.2255809 0.070
POP4 -0.1101778 0.1879261 0.558 -0.1769792 0.1842804 0.337
POP5 -0.2025597 0.0939734 0.031 -0.1504447 0.0928847 0.105
INF 0.0072868 0.0549224 0.894 0.0310215 0.0539316 0.565
DPHY 0.0788513 0.027162 0.004 0.0768944 0.0264956 0.004
DPHA 0.6536462 0.0468989 0.000 0.6916768 0.0469933 0.000
DBOR 0.0275946 0.0605708 0.649 0.0554975 0.0593344 0.350
DLAT 0.0678903 0.0898894 0.450 0.1175204 0.0818143 0.151
DHOSP 0.0100526 0.0462533 0.828 0.0089593 0.0451583 0.843
dt2 -0.1355012 0.0108294 0.000 -0.1326363 0.0107027 0.000
dt3 -0.1270158 0.0104178 0.000 -0.1242904 0.0103106 0.000
 -0.3537783 0.0891222 0.000 -0.3323822 0.0871533 0.000
 0.5346576 0.0534699 0.063 0.5346576 0.0534699 0.063
 0.23122444 0.22573567
 0.070791 0.070791
2due to i 0.91430063 0.91046009
Number of obs. 720 720
Number of groups 240 240
R2 within 0.4055 0.4076
R2 between 0.7921 0.8005
R2 overall 0.7839 0.7923
Notes: The instruments used in the spatial random-e¤ects IV regressions (SRE2SLS) are the lagged
variable of price (PAt 1), Yt, POP1t, POP2t, POP4t, POP5t, INFt, DPHYt, DPHAt, PCt, DBORt, DLATt,
DHOSPt, NODISPt, DISP50t (DISPt in the continous variable regression), dt2, dt3, and their spatial lags.
First-stage regressions on the instruments yield signicant joint F-tests. Moreover, the p-value of the Sargan-test
statistics does not reject the null hypothesis and concludes that the overidentifying restriction is valid.
Table 3: Parameter estimates of spatial random-e¤ects IV regressions (SRE2SLS).
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of antibiotic consumption (both spatial lag and spatial error e¤ects) into account. Find-
ings indicate that dispensing practices are associated to higher rates of antibiotic use,
after controlling for spatial consumption externalities. Nevertheless, the social implica-
tions of this result are puzzling. Evidence of important spatial spillovers, some of which
are unobservable, suggests that socially optimal levels of antibiotic consumption cannot
be easily dened. It has been shown that Switzerland exhibits relatively low levels of
antibiotic consumption as compared to other European countries. Consequently, whether
a regime of direct dispensing lead to overuse of antibiotics is unclear. This may raise
public concern over a correct evaluation of all benets and costs of direct dispensing of
antibiotic treatment and foster further research in the area.
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Appendix
Demand for physician consultations
Let pcj 2 [0; 1] be the probability of a correct diagnosis by GP j. Diagnostic services
(ej) are bounded in the range ej 2

emin; emax

and increase the probability of a correct
diagnosis through the following relationship pcj(ej) = ej , with  2 [0; 1]. For simplicity,
we set emin = 0 and emax = 1=. Both types of infections (viral and bacterial) are equally
likely. Hence, p = p[i = b; v]  0:5. Consequently, the probability that the diagnosis is a
bacterial infection and an antibiotic is correctly prescribed is ppcj =
1
2ej . The probability
of mistaken diagnosis is 12(1  ej).
Since patients split equally between the two practices, doctor js total demand for
consultations by young patients () is:
Dylt(elt) =

2

1 +
1
2
(1  elt)

, (13)
where 12 (1  elt) is the proportion of patients with a bacterial infection who need a
second consultation because of wrong diagnosis. Similarly, we can write the demand for
GP r as Dyrt(ert) =  [1 + (1  ert)=2] =2.
A number of individuals DAyt 1 is healthy in the second period, where  2 [0; 1] is
the marginal prevention e¤ect from antibiotic treatment, and DAyt 1 is the total num-
ber of young patients receiving antibiotics from both GPs in period t   1. The total
number of young patients receiving antibiotics is obtained by adding the number of
patients with a viral infection who receive an antibiotic because of wrong diagnosis,

2
1
2(1 elt 1), to the total number of young patients with a bacterial infection, =2. Us-
ing (13), we get DAylt 1(elt 1) = (D
y
lt 1   =4). Hence, considering both GPs, we obtain:
DAyt 1(elt 1; ert 1) = D
Ay
lt 1 +D
Ay
rt 1 = D
y
lt 1 +D
y
rt 1   =2
Total demand for consultations for GP l in each period t can be written by summing
up the demand for consultations by young and old patients as
Dlt(elt; elt 1; ert 1) = D
y
lt +


2
  DAyt 1

1 +
1
2
(1  elt)

: (14)
The term 12 (1  elt) within the squared brackets is the fraction of old patients with
a bacterial infection who need a second consultation because of wrong diagnosis. Note
that diagnosis e¤ort in period t 1 a¤ects demand in the following period through Dylt 1.
Total second-period demand for GP r can be derived similarly as above.
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The physicians objective function
Using (14) we can write GP ls intertemporal prot at time t as
Vlt =
1X
t=k
t klt(elt; elt 1; ert 1) (15)
=
1X
t=k
t k

(f   c)Dlt(elt; elt 1; ert 1) + (z   )DAlt (elt; elt 1; ert 1)+
 DAyt 1 (elt 1; ert 1)  e2lt
i
,
where  2 (0; 1] is the discount factor for future prots, f is the xed fee for a consultation,
c is the xed marginal cost of a consultation (c < f),  is the marginal cost of diagnostic
services, and  is the cost of bacterial resistance generated by each young patient treated
with antibiotics in period t 1. Note that Dl1 = Dyl1 since there are only young consumers
in the market, andDyl0 = 0. The expected costs and benets of dispensing are (z   )DAlt ,
where z is the unit price of drugs dispensed to the patient and   z represents the unit
cost of drugs on stock. DAlt = Dlt  ( DAyt 1)=2 is the number of antibiotic treatments
in period t. The number of antibiotic treatments sold is obtained by summing up the
number of young and old patients with a bacterial infection (correctly diagnosed), the
number of individuals with a viral infection with a wrong diagnosis, and the number of
patients who require a second consultation because a bacterial infection was not initially
diagnosed. From total demand for consultations, Dlt, we subtract the number of patients
with a correct diagnosis not treated with antibiotics. These are =4 young patients with
viral infections and

=2  DAyt 1

=2 old patients with viral infections. We simplify
equation (15) by setting c = 0 and  = 0.
Market equilibrium
A pair of reaction functions (Rl and Rr) form a Markov perfect equilibrium if elt =
Rl(ert 1) maximizes GP ls intertemporal prot at any time, given ert 1 and assuming
that GP l will move according to Rl, and the same holds for GP r. To solve for a Markov
perfect equilibrium, let Vl(er) be the present discounted value of GP ls prots given
that last period GP r played er and that from this time forth both GPs play optimally,
i.e. according to their Markov strategies, and let Vl(el) be the present discounted value
of GP ls prots given that last period GP l played el and that hereafter both GPs
play optimally. Vr(el) and Vr(er) are symmetric. Given that GP js choice of ej is
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restricted to a bounded set, the following are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
reaction and value functions to be consistent and correspond to an equilibrium: Vl(er) =
max
el
fl(el; er) + Vl(el)g = l(Rl(er); er) + Vl(Rl(er)) and Vl(el) = l(el; Rr(el)) +
Vl(Rr(el)).
Because diagnosis e¤ort a¤ects prots in two subsequent periods and expected prots
are the sum of concave functions in elt, we can write the following rst-order conditions
for GP l - the dynamic reaction function - using (15) as:
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and symmetrically for GP r. The second-order conditions are @V
2
lt
@2elt
=  2 < 0. Using
(13) and (14) we get @Dlt@elt =  

2

   DAyt 1

=  2
n
1  
h
1  4 (elt 1 + ert 1)
io
and @Dlt+1@elt =  

1 + 12 (1  elt+1)
 @DAyt
@elt
. Since @D
Ay
t
@elt
=  4 we then get @Dlt+1@elt =

4

1 + 12 (1  elt+1)

. We have @D
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. Substituting for @Dlt=@elt, @Dlt+1=@elt, @DAlt=@elt, @D
A
lt+1=@elt, and
@DAyt =@elt in (16) and solving for the level of diagnostic services assuming for simplicity
 = 1 and imposing @Vlt=@elt = @Vlt+1=@elt+1 = 0 and @Vrt=@ert = @Vrt+1=@ert+1 = 0,
we then get the equilibrium level of diagnostic services dened by equation (1) in the
main text.
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